Re: What could be the advantages and disadvantages of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism?
Mr. Gerd Winter,
Germany#5143
Germany#5143
il y a 13 ans
I have a comment which is difficult to exclusively relate to a single of the questions allowed in this round. May it nevertheless be heard.
1. The sharing of monetary gains as proposed by Prof. Vogel and Dr. Ruiz is commendable because it allows to get rid of the intricacies of PIC and MAT as well as of differentiating between non-commercial and commercial utilisation of genetic resources. Authors of the upcoming book “Common Pools of Genetic Ressources” (eds Evanson Chege Kamau and Gerd Winter) also support this idea although develop it rather from a sociological than economical perspective.
2. More important than the sharing of monetary gains is however the question how R & D on genetic resources and traditional knowledge can be organised in cooperation between resource and user states so that capacity building and technology development and transfer becomes reality. Such cooperative systems could at the same time take responsibility for monetary benefit sharing (if any). The interesting fact is that many multilateral systems of this kind already exist without an international legal framework. In the mentioned book we perceive them as transnational common pools of genetic resources and traditional knowledge (or transnational networks of the relevant actors). The following types can be distinguished:
- grassroots pools/networks which aim at local services
- basic research pools/networks encompassing collections of organisms and information
- applied research pools/networks
- commercial development pools/networks
An international legal instrument could be designed which sets a framework for such pools and networks helping them to develop further and cope with ABS requirements. Such instrument could be based on articles 4, 10 and 11 collectively.
1. The sharing of monetary gains as proposed by Prof. Vogel and Dr. Ruiz is commendable because it allows to get rid of the intricacies of PIC and MAT as well as of differentiating between non-commercial and commercial utilisation of genetic resources. Authors of the upcoming book “Common Pools of Genetic Ressources” (eds Evanson Chege Kamau and Gerd Winter) also support this idea although develop it rather from a sociological than economical perspective.
2. More important than the sharing of monetary gains is however the question how R & D on genetic resources and traditional knowledge can be organised in cooperation between resource and user states so that capacity building and technology development and transfer becomes reality. Such cooperative systems could at the same time take responsibility for monetary benefit sharing (if any). The interesting fact is that many multilateral systems of this kind already exist without an international legal framework. In the mentioned book we perceive them as transnational common pools of genetic resources and traditional knowledge (or transnational networks of the relevant actors). The following types can be distinguished:
- grassroots pools/networks which aim at local services
- basic research pools/networks encompassing collections of organisms and information
- applied research pools/networks
- commercial development pools/networks
An international legal instrument could be designed which sets a framework for such pools and networks helping them to develop further and cope with ABS requirements. Such instrument could be based on articles 4, 10 and 11 collectively.
The failure of the bilateral approach to ABS is rooted in the misclassification of “genetic resources” as “material”. Although the suggestion of “common pools of genetic resources” may coincide with the implications of the economics of information, one should be wary. The classification of “genetic resources” as “material” is not being corrected as another concept is being layered onto the ABS debate, viz., “common pools”.
The word “commons” is conflicted in the history of thought. Garrett Hardin (in)famously used it in his 1968 essay “The Tragedy of the Commons”, which remains the most cited article in the history of the journal Science. Hardin’s choice of “commons” unleashed withering criticism from various scholars. The political scientist Elinor Ostrom would even win the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics "for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons" [http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/] Despite the unusual transdisciplinary recognition, Ostrom did not refute Hardin’s argument. Twenty-six years after publishing “The Tragedy”, Hardin would lament that “the weightiest mistake in my synthesizing paper was the omission of the modifying adjective ‘unmanaged’”, i.e., The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons (“Essays on Science and Society: Extensions of ‘The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science 1998). Economists now interpret Hardin’s intended meaning of “commons” as “open access.”
The history of the word “commons” should give us pause when we contemplate “common pools of genetic resources.” The retention of “genetic resources” as the object of ABS would exclude biomimicry, non-human culture, and perhaps hitherto unimagined expressions of natural information. Moreover, the continued classification of “genetic resources” as “material” would open the possibility of competition among “pools”, thereby attenuating but not eliminating the race-to-the-bottom that besets the bilateral approach.
Another semantic problem surfaces. The term “common pools” assumes that one knows what is in common, i.e., which countries are members of the group. Bounded openness makes no such assumption. Claimants only become known when the commercial success of the patented biotechnology warrants the ex post discovery of the claimants and their relative shares of habitat.
The Parsimony Principle (a k a Ockham’s Razor) favors “bounded openness over natural information” as the mechanism for the fair and equitable sharing of benefits. Fortunately, much of this ground has been covered in many venues, including: ““From the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ to the ‘Tragedy of the Commonplace’ Analysis and Synthesis through the lens of Economic Theory.” Chapter Nine of McManis, Charles, Biodiversity & Law, (London: EARTHSCAN, 2007), pp 115-136.
http://www.planta.cn/forum/files_planta/biodiversity_and_the_law_107.pdf
The word “commons” is conflicted in the history of thought. Garrett Hardin (in)famously used it in his 1968 essay “The Tragedy of the Commons”, which remains the most cited article in the history of the journal Science. Hardin’s choice of “commons” unleashed withering criticism from various scholars. The political scientist Elinor Ostrom would even win the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics "for her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons" [http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/] Despite the unusual transdisciplinary recognition, Ostrom did not refute Hardin’s argument. Twenty-six years after publishing “The Tragedy”, Hardin would lament that “the weightiest mistake in my synthesizing paper was the omission of the modifying adjective ‘unmanaged’”, i.e., The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons (“Essays on Science and Society: Extensions of ‘The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science 1998). Economists now interpret Hardin’s intended meaning of “commons” as “open access.”
The history of the word “commons” should give us pause when we contemplate “common pools of genetic resources.” The retention of “genetic resources” as the object of ABS would exclude biomimicry, non-human culture, and perhaps hitherto unimagined expressions of natural information. Moreover, the continued classification of “genetic resources” as “material” would open the possibility of competition among “pools”, thereby attenuating but not eliminating the race-to-the-bottom that besets the bilateral approach.
Another semantic problem surfaces. The term “common pools” assumes that one knows what is in common, i.e., which countries are members of the group. Bounded openness makes no such assumption. Claimants only become known when the commercial success of the patented biotechnology warrants the ex post discovery of the claimants and their relative shares of habitat.
The Parsimony Principle (a k a Ockham’s Razor) favors “bounded openness over natural information” as the mechanism for the fair and equitable sharing of benefits. Fortunately, much of this ground has been covered in many venues, including: ““From the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ to the ‘Tragedy of the Commonplace’ Analysis and Synthesis through the lens of Economic Theory.” Chapter Nine of McManis, Charles, Biodiversity & Law, (London: EARTHSCAN, 2007), pp 115-136.
http://www.planta.cn/forum/files_planta/biodiversity_and_the_law_107.pdf
