What influence might other articles of the Nagoya Protocol have in the context of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism?
Ms. Kathryn Garforth,
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity#5080
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity#5080
13 years ago
The third indicative question for round 2 of the online discussions on Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol is as follows:
What influence might other articles of the Nagoya Protocol have in the context of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism?
What influence might other articles of the Nagoya Protocol have in the context of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism?
Dear all,
Relationship to NP art 8:
One of the topics in round 1 which I find challenges is the assumption that one the one side there is academic research and on the other hand, there is commercial research. This clear division is difficult to find in the university-systems of today, as universities uses patents to secure rights to their research results and there is governmental encoragement to publicly funded research shall lead to commercial firms. This I would assume is indeed the situation in the branches where large sums of public research mony are spent - as is the situation in biotechnology-related research.
Here the call for expedious access arises. But this formulation somewhat assumes that access is burdensome. Domestic implementation in any country of ABS needs to consider how an ABS system can be unhindred and easy.
Relationship to CBD art 15.7:
NP art 10 stated that: "global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to address the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources". The wording lends from the benefit-sharing principle of the CBD. Here utilization plays a prominent role - in discussing the elements in a GMBSM, there is a need to consider the link to general rules securing that benefits from the utilisation is being followed up. The link between the details of a GMBSM and how to make utilisation contribute to the objectives of the CBD and NP is a core issue to make function.
Relationship to NP art 8:
One of the topics in round 1 which I find challenges is the assumption that one the one side there is academic research and on the other hand, there is commercial research. This clear division is difficult to find in the university-systems of today, as universities uses patents to secure rights to their research results and there is governmental encoragement to publicly funded research shall lead to commercial firms. This I would assume is indeed the situation in the branches where large sums of public research mony are spent - as is the situation in biotechnology-related research.
Here the call for expedious access arises. But this formulation somewhat assumes that access is burdensome. Domestic implementation in any country of ABS needs to consider how an ABS system can be unhindred and easy.
Relationship to CBD art 15.7:
NP art 10 stated that: "global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to address the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources". The wording lends from the benefit-sharing principle of the CBD. Here utilization plays a prominent role - in discussing the elements in a GMBSM, there is a need to consider the link to general rules securing that benefits from the utilisation is being followed up. The link between the details of a GMBSM and how to make utilisation contribute to the objectives of the CBD and NP is a core issue to make function.
They have a lot of influence as the Global Mechanism should have a mandate and rules of procedure and operating under the principles and objectives of the Nagoya Protocol.
The problem of definitions re-surfaces. According to Article 2 (e) of the Nagoya Protocol “(e) ‘Derivative’ means a naturally occurring biochemical compound resulting from the genetic expression or metabolism of biological or genetic resources, even if it does not contain functional units of heredity.”
Phenomena exist where derivatives do not possess a “naturally occurring biochemical compound” and are transboundary. The argument appears in “Epilogue: Architecture by Committee and the Conceptual Integrity of the Nagoya Protocol” in the edited volume by Vernooy and Ruiz, “The Custodians of Biodiversity: Sharing Access to and Benefits of Genetic Resources” (Earthscan, 2012)
“Under the Nagoya Protocol, no benefit from any patented biomimicry would have to be shared with any country of origin. Were such anomalies identified in the run-up to Nagoya? ... In 2007, I [Vogel] published a comprehensive article in the International Union for the Conservation of Nature ABS series which is freely available online in English, French and Spanish (Vogel 2007a). In Table 1, ‘Tilted playing fields in the hyperspace of ABS,’ the columns identify 16 distortions in light of the general theory of second best and the economics of information. Distortion number 13 is ‘symbolic phenotypic expressions ... for patents on designs inspired from nature’—in other words, biomimicry. But even in 2007, such anomalies were not new to the CBD literati. In Genes for sale (Vogel 1994: 43), the textbox ‘Monkey know-how’ describes how ‘[t]he remarkable Jane Goodall ... documented that ill chimpanzees pick leaves of plants known to possess therapeutic effects.’ For patents arising from biomimicry or non-human culture, no ABS agreement would be necessary under Article 2(e), as no ‘biochemical compound’ would be obtained in R&D... After a bit of daydreaming, I can imagine the existence of useful fractal designs in the crystals of thermal pools threatened by nearby geothermal exploration. A Google search quickly generates hits. Defining the object of ABS as natural information would include such crystals; the ad hoc definitions...would not.” (pp 182-183)
In English at page 181: http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/47481/1/IDL-47481.pdf
In Spanish, see page 383: “Anuario Andino de Derechos Intelectuales” ed., Baldo Kresalja Roselló, 2011, Año 7 no. 7, Palestra Editores, Lima, Peru
Phenomena exist where derivatives do not possess a “naturally occurring biochemical compound” and are transboundary. The argument appears in “Epilogue: Architecture by Committee and the Conceptual Integrity of the Nagoya Protocol” in the edited volume by Vernooy and Ruiz, “The Custodians of Biodiversity: Sharing Access to and Benefits of Genetic Resources” (Earthscan, 2012)
“Under the Nagoya Protocol, no benefit from any patented biomimicry would have to be shared with any country of origin. Were such anomalies identified in the run-up to Nagoya? ... In 2007, I [Vogel] published a comprehensive article in the International Union for the Conservation of Nature ABS series which is freely available online in English, French and Spanish (Vogel 2007a). In Table 1, ‘Tilted playing fields in the hyperspace of ABS,’ the columns identify 16 distortions in light of the general theory of second best and the economics of information. Distortion number 13 is ‘symbolic phenotypic expressions ... for patents on designs inspired from nature’—in other words, biomimicry. But even in 2007, such anomalies were not new to the CBD literati. In Genes for sale (Vogel 1994: 43), the textbox ‘Monkey know-how’ describes how ‘[t]he remarkable Jane Goodall ... documented that ill chimpanzees pick leaves of plants known to possess therapeutic effects.’ For patents arising from biomimicry or non-human culture, no ABS agreement would be necessary under Article 2(e), as no ‘biochemical compound’ would be obtained in R&D... After a bit of daydreaming, I can imagine the existence of useful fractal designs in the crystals of thermal pools threatened by nearby geothermal exploration. A Google search quickly generates hits. Defining the object of ABS as natural information would include such crystals; the ad hoc definitions...would not.” (pp 182-183)
In English at page 181: http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/47481/1/IDL-47481.pdf
In Spanish, see page 383: “Anuario Andino de Derechos Intelectuales” ed., Baldo Kresalja Roselló, 2011, Año 7 no. 7, Palestra Editores, Lima, Peru
Dear all,
While Article 10 provides the legal basis for consideration of a potential global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism that could be established in the future in order to address the fair and equitable benefit-sharing in specific cases where bilateral ABS on the basis of PIC and MAT is problematic. The fair and equitable benefit-sharing is also addressed in different parts of the Nagoya Protocol. While Article 5 is the main benefit-sharing provision, Articles 9, 10, 19, 20, and 23 and the Annex address particular aspects in this context.
Article 5(1) picks up on the fundamental notions already included in Article 15(3) and 15(7) of the CBD.
It clarifies that:
- benefits to be shared shall include those arising from the utilization of genetic resources but also those arising from subsequent applications and commercialization;
- benefits shall be shared only with the Party providing such resources, which is “defined” as the country of origin of such resources or a Party that has acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the CBD; and
- Specific benefit-sharing arrangements will be established through MAT between the provider and the user of genetic resources, thus on a contract basis.
Article 5(1) has to be read with Article 5(3), which includes the actual obligation for Parties to take measures, as appropriate, to implement paragraph 1. Article 5(4) repeats that benefits may be monetary as well as non-monetary and refers to the Annex, which includes an indicative and non-exhaustive list of potential monetary and non-monetary benefits to be shared. The concrete benefits (possibly a mix of non-monetary and monetary) will need to be identified by providers and users in MAT, as they are likely to vary between different types of uses and different sectors. The examples provided in the Annex are taken verbatim from Appendix II of the Bonn Guidelines. Finally, Article 5(5) addresses benefit-sharing in relation to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. Accordingly, Parties are required to take measures, as appropriate, so that the benefits arising from the utilization of such traditional knowledge are shared fairly and equitably with the ILCs holding the knowledge. Such benefit-sharing shall be upon MAT.
Article 9 suggests the direction in which shared benefits should flow. Parties are obliged to encourage their providers and users to direct the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources towards the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. This provision reaffirms the linkages between benefit-sharing and the other two objectives of the CBD (conservation and sustainable use).
Articles 19 and 20 include obligations for Parties to encourage the development, update, and use of sectoral and cross-sectoral model contractual clauses for MAT, as well as voluntary codes of conduct, guidelines, and best practices and/or standards in relation to ABS. If properly implemented by the Parties, these instruments will create a supportive environment for providers and users to successfully negotiate, develop, and execute fair and equitable benefit-sharing agreements.
Article 23 focuses on two specific types of non-monetary benefit-sharing: collaboration and co-operation in technical and scientific research and development programmes, as well as access to and transfer of technology. While there is a clear obligation to collaborate and co-operate in such research programmes (Article 23, sentence 1), the provision includes only a general commitment, not an obligation, regarding the promotion and encouragement of access to technology by developing country Parties and the transfer of technology to them (Article 23, sentence 2).
Warm regards,
O.A.ElKawy
While Article 10 provides the legal basis for consideration of a potential global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism that could be established in the future in order to address the fair and equitable benefit-sharing in specific cases where bilateral ABS on the basis of PIC and MAT is problematic. The fair and equitable benefit-sharing is also addressed in different parts of the Nagoya Protocol. While Article 5 is the main benefit-sharing provision, Articles 9, 10, 19, 20, and 23 and the Annex address particular aspects in this context.
Article 5(1) picks up on the fundamental notions already included in Article 15(3) and 15(7) of the CBD.
It clarifies that:
- benefits to be shared shall include those arising from the utilization of genetic resources but also those arising from subsequent applications and commercialization;
- benefits shall be shared only with the Party providing such resources, which is “defined” as the country of origin of such resources or a Party that has acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the CBD; and
- Specific benefit-sharing arrangements will be established through MAT between the provider and the user of genetic resources, thus on a contract basis.
Article 5(1) has to be read with Article 5(3), which includes the actual obligation for Parties to take measures, as appropriate, to implement paragraph 1. Article 5(4) repeats that benefits may be monetary as well as non-monetary and refers to the Annex, which includes an indicative and non-exhaustive list of potential monetary and non-monetary benefits to be shared. The concrete benefits (possibly a mix of non-monetary and monetary) will need to be identified by providers and users in MAT, as they are likely to vary between different types of uses and different sectors. The examples provided in the Annex are taken verbatim from Appendix II of the Bonn Guidelines. Finally, Article 5(5) addresses benefit-sharing in relation to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. Accordingly, Parties are required to take measures, as appropriate, so that the benefits arising from the utilization of such traditional knowledge are shared fairly and equitably with the ILCs holding the knowledge. Such benefit-sharing shall be upon MAT.
Article 9 suggests the direction in which shared benefits should flow. Parties are obliged to encourage their providers and users to direct the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources towards the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. This provision reaffirms the linkages between benefit-sharing and the other two objectives of the CBD (conservation and sustainable use).
Articles 19 and 20 include obligations for Parties to encourage the development, update, and use of sectoral and cross-sectoral model contractual clauses for MAT, as well as voluntary codes of conduct, guidelines, and best practices and/or standards in relation to ABS. If properly implemented by the Parties, these instruments will create a supportive environment for providers and users to successfully negotiate, develop, and execute fair and equitable benefit-sharing agreements.
Article 23 focuses on two specific types of non-monetary benefit-sharing: collaboration and co-operation in technical and scientific research and development programmes, as well as access to and transfer of technology. While there is a clear obligation to collaborate and co-operate in such research programmes (Article 23, sentence 1), the provision includes only a general commitment, not an obligation, regarding the promotion and encouragement of access to technology by developing country Parties and the transfer of technology to them (Article 23, sentence 2).
Warm regards,
O.A.ElKawy
FRENCH
-Les articles 5 et 6 qui traitent de façon indirecte toutes les questions relatives au champ d’application temporel.
- l’article 2 qui clarifie le champ d’application matériel par la définition de l’utilisation des ressources génétiques.
-Article 5.1 : qui traite de l’inclusion des collections ex-situ
-Article 4 : qui prévoit la possibilité de créer des approches sectorielles et internationales
ENGLISH
Sections 5 and 6 deal with all the issues indirectly related to temporal scope.
- Article 2 clarifies that the material scope of the definition of the utilization of genetic resources.
-Article 5.1 which deals with the inclusion of ex-situ collections
-Article 4, which provides the ability to create sectoral and international approaches
-Les articles 5 et 6 qui traitent de façon indirecte toutes les questions relatives au champ d’application temporel.
- l’article 2 qui clarifie le champ d’application matériel par la définition de l’utilisation des ressources génétiques.
-Article 5.1 : qui traite de l’inclusion des collections ex-situ
-Article 4 : qui prévoit la possibilité de créer des approches sectorielles et internationales
ENGLISH
Sections 5 and 6 deal with all the issues indirectly related to temporal scope.
- Article 2 clarifies that the material scope of the definition of the utilization of genetic resources.
-Article 5.1 which deals with the inclusion of ex-situ collections
-Article 4, which provides the ability to create sectoral and international approaches
Under open boundedness, a global multilateral benefit-sharing system would not need to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial research. The sharing of monetary benefits with countries of origin would only occur for commercially successful biotechnologies that derive from natural information. Over the life of the patent, should the accumulated royalties never surpass the transaction costs associated with distribution of benefits, then the collected royalties would go to the infrastructure that enables the system.
Article 3 on scope clearly states that the scope of the Protocol is that of Article 15 of the Convention, which recognizes sovereign rights over natural resources, and that the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests with national governments and is subject to national legislation. Article 10 is subject to this scope, as are all other articles in the Nagoya Protocol. For this reason, it is difficult to see how natural resources that fall outside the jurisdiction of a state could be covered by a GMBSM under Article 10.
Article 6 echos Article 15 of the Convention, stating that prior informed consent is subject to the exercise of a sovereign right of a Party.
Article 11 on transboundary cooperation clearly has a role to play, as it affords an agreed upon alternative to the non negotiated concept in Article 10 of creating a GMBSM.
Article 6 echos Article 15 of the Convention, stating that prior informed consent is subject to the exercise of a sovereign right of a Party.
Article 11 on transboundary cooperation clearly has a role to play, as it affords an agreed upon alternative to the non negotiated concept in Article 10 of creating a GMBSM.
Regarding #5165: “[I]t is difficult to see how natural resources that fall outside the jurisdiction of a state could be covered by a GMBSM under Article 10.” Au contraire, it is easy to see how natural information that is accessed outside the jurisdiction of a state could be covered by a GMBSM under Article 10. Natural information may reside in one or more species, which in turn may be located in more than one jurisdiction. Hence, the GMBSM does not fall outside the jurisdiction of a state when the biotechnology is imported; a countervailing tariff should be levied for the importing country’s fair share, being one of many countries of origin.
Article 1 is relevant because it refers to benefit sharing “including by appropriate access”, thereby confirming that utilisation, not access, is the real trigger of benefit sharing obligations.
Article 2 is relevant because it defines utilisation and clarifies that it includes naturally occurring biochemical derivatives (thereby substantially extending the chances that resources “occur in a transboundary situation” while at the same time raising issues of resource locking caused by composition of matter patents granted on derivatives obtained from related – or sometimes even unrelated – resources.)
Article 3 is relevant because it was only agreed on the clear understanding that the unresolved scope issues will be further discussed under Article 10.
Article 4 is relevant because the GMBSM might provide a stepping stone towards specialised sectoral ABS arrangements or even new instruments.
Article 5 is relevant because the GMBSM would provide an additional way to establish and discharge benefit sharing obligations.
Article 6 is relevant because Parties that do not require PIC can use the GMBSM to ensure that their free access system does not undermine the global system, and Parties that do require PIC can decide to channel some of the benefits through a global mechanism.
Article 7 is relevant because so much ATK occurs in transboundary situations, or is available in the public domain.
Article 8 is relevant because the GMBSM can be used as a scaffolding for developing special ABS measures for the specific situations mentioned.
Article 9 is relevant because it can inter alia be implemented by voluntary directing a percentage of bilateral benefits into a global mechanism.
Article 11 is relevant because a functioning GMBSM would help countries to discharge their cooperation obligations under this article in a cost-effective manner.
Article 12 is relevant because so much ATK occurs in transboundary situations.
Article 13 is relevant to the extent that Parties choose to include the GMBSM in their domestic ABS systems (in which case must be made available and/notified to the Secretariat).
Article 14 is relevant for information exchange and transparency around the GMBSM.
Article 15 is relevant to the extent that some Parties voluntarily incorporate elements of the GMBSM into their domestic systems. It is also potentially relevant in cases involving the utilisation of very common and widely distributed resources, which would need an unfeasibly large number of PICs and MATs.
Article 16 is relevant if the GMBSM has been incorporated into national systems, and potentially in cases of very common or widely distributed ATK.
Article 17 is relevant in that the GMBSM could provide an alternative way to proceed through certain checkpoints under defined circumstances.
Article 18 is relevant because use of the GMBSM might be agreed in MAT.
Article 19 is relevant because the existence of a GMBSM would enable an approach of capturing interim benefits while trying out sectoral model clauses and even whole SMTAs within a common framework.
Article 20 is relevant because the GMBSM might well come to form part of codes of conduct etc.
Article 21 is relevant because the GMBSM will raise enough awareness to put it beyond doubt that all privatised benefits from the utilisation of GR and ATK must be shared to support conservation and sustainable use.
Article 22 is relevant because the GMBSM can be used as a short-term substitute by countries that have not yet developed adequate national capacity to run a full-blown ABS system, or who have such limited ABS opportunities that they cannot justify the cost of establishing dedicated ABS capacity. It can also help to identify areas in which capacity development is needed. It can also provide funding for capacity development directly relevant to conservation and sustainable use.
Article 23 is relevant because the GMBSM can fund technology transfer for conservation and sustainable use.
Article 24 is relevant because the GMBSM can provide a vessel for receiving benefit contributions from users domiciled in non-Parties.
Article 25.6 is relevant because the GMBSM could be one way to channel financial resources.
The relevance of the rest of the Articles would depend on the agreed modalities of the GMBSM.
Article 2 is relevant because it defines utilisation and clarifies that it includes naturally occurring biochemical derivatives (thereby substantially extending the chances that resources “occur in a transboundary situation” while at the same time raising issues of resource locking caused by composition of matter patents granted on derivatives obtained from related – or sometimes even unrelated – resources.)
Article 3 is relevant because it was only agreed on the clear understanding that the unresolved scope issues will be further discussed under Article 10.
Article 4 is relevant because the GMBSM might provide a stepping stone towards specialised sectoral ABS arrangements or even new instruments.
Article 5 is relevant because the GMBSM would provide an additional way to establish and discharge benefit sharing obligations.
Article 6 is relevant because Parties that do not require PIC can use the GMBSM to ensure that their free access system does not undermine the global system, and Parties that do require PIC can decide to channel some of the benefits through a global mechanism.
Article 7 is relevant because so much ATK occurs in transboundary situations, or is available in the public domain.
Article 8 is relevant because the GMBSM can be used as a scaffolding for developing special ABS measures for the specific situations mentioned.
Article 9 is relevant because it can inter alia be implemented by voluntary directing a percentage of bilateral benefits into a global mechanism.
Article 11 is relevant because a functioning GMBSM would help countries to discharge their cooperation obligations under this article in a cost-effective manner.
Article 12 is relevant because so much ATK occurs in transboundary situations.
Article 13 is relevant to the extent that Parties choose to include the GMBSM in their domestic ABS systems (in which case must be made available and/notified to the Secretariat).
Article 14 is relevant for information exchange and transparency around the GMBSM.
Article 15 is relevant to the extent that some Parties voluntarily incorporate elements of the GMBSM into their domestic systems. It is also potentially relevant in cases involving the utilisation of very common and widely distributed resources, which would need an unfeasibly large number of PICs and MATs.
Article 16 is relevant if the GMBSM has been incorporated into national systems, and potentially in cases of very common or widely distributed ATK.
Article 17 is relevant in that the GMBSM could provide an alternative way to proceed through certain checkpoints under defined circumstances.
Article 18 is relevant because use of the GMBSM might be agreed in MAT.
Article 19 is relevant because the existence of a GMBSM would enable an approach of capturing interim benefits while trying out sectoral model clauses and even whole SMTAs within a common framework.
Article 20 is relevant because the GMBSM might well come to form part of codes of conduct etc.
Article 21 is relevant because the GMBSM will raise enough awareness to put it beyond doubt that all privatised benefits from the utilisation of GR and ATK must be shared to support conservation and sustainable use.
Article 22 is relevant because the GMBSM can be used as a short-term substitute by countries that have not yet developed adequate national capacity to run a full-blown ABS system, or who have such limited ABS opportunities that they cannot justify the cost of establishing dedicated ABS capacity. It can also help to identify areas in which capacity development is needed. It can also provide funding for capacity development directly relevant to conservation and sustainable use.
Article 23 is relevant because the GMBSM can fund technology transfer for conservation and sustainable use.
Article 24 is relevant because the GMBSM can provide a vessel for receiving benefit contributions from users domiciled in non-Parties.
Article 25.6 is relevant because the GMBSM could be one way to channel financial resources.
The relevance of the rest of the Articles would depend on the agreed modalities of the GMBSM.
Posted on behalf of Marwan al Bassatneh, Arab Centre for the Studies of Arid Zones and Dry Lands (posted late as original message was mis-directed):
1) Article 5(1) picks up on the fundamental notions already included in Article 15(3) and 15(7) of the CBD.
It clarifies that:
- benefits to be shared shall include those arising from the utilization of genetic resources but also those arising from subsequent applications and commercialization;
- benefits shall be shared only with the Party providing such resources, which is “defined” as the country of origin of such resources or a Party that has acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the CBD; and
- Specific benefit-sharing arrangements will be established through MAT between the provider and the user of genetic resources, thus on a contract basis.
2) Article 9 suggests the direction in which shared benefits should flow. Parties are obliged to encourage their providers and users to direct the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources towards the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. This provision reaffirms the linkages between benefit-sharing and the other two objectives of the CBD (conservation and sustainable use).
3) Articles 19 and 20 include obligations for Parties to encourage the development, update, and use of sectorial and cross-sectorial model contractual clauses for MAT, as well as voluntary codes of conduct, guidelines, and best practices and/or standards in relation to ABS. If properly implemented by the Parties, these instruments will create a supportive environment for providers and users to successfully negotiate, develop, and execute fair and equitable benefit-sharing agreements.
4) Article 23 focuses on two specific types of non-monetary benefit-sharing: collaboration and co-operation in technical and scientific research and development programs, as well as access to and transfer of technology. While there is a clear obligation to collaborate and co-operate in such research programs (Article 23, sentence 1), the provision includes only a general commitment, not an obligation, regarding the promotion and encouragement of access to technology by developing country Parties and the transfer of technology to them (Article 23, sentence 2).
1) Article 5(1) picks up on the fundamental notions already included in Article 15(3) and 15(7) of the CBD.
It clarifies that:
- benefits to be shared shall include those arising from the utilization of genetic resources but also those arising from subsequent applications and commercialization;
- benefits shall be shared only with the Party providing such resources, which is “defined” as the country of origin of such resources or a Party that has acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the CBD; and
- Specific benefit-sharing arrangements will be established through MAT between the provider and the user of genetic resources, thus on a contract basis.
2) Article 9 suggests the direction in which shared benefits should flow. Parties are obliged to encourage their providers and users to direct the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources towards the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. This provision reaffirms the linkages between benefit-sharing and the other two objectives of the CBD (conservation and sustainable use).
3) Articles 19 and 20 include obligations for Parties to encourage the development, update, and use of sectorial and cross-sectorial model contractual clauses for MAT, as well as voluntary codes of conduct, guidelines, and best practices and/or standards in relation to ABS. If properly implemented by the Parties, these instruments will create a supportive environment for providers and users to successfully negotiate, develop, and execute fair and equitable benefit-sharing agreements.
4) Article 23 focuses on two specific types of non-monetary benefit-sharing: collaboration and co-operation in technical and scientific research and development programs, as well as access to and transfer of technology. While there is a clear obligation to collaborate and co-operate in such research programs (Article 23, sentence 1), the provision includes only a general commitment, not an obligation, regarding the promotion and encouragement of access to technology by developing country Parties and the transfer of technology to them (Article 23, sentence 2).
